N o segment of the population is immune from the devastation of mental illness. In fact, many health care workers are affected by personal bouts of depression , bipolar illness, anxiety concerns, eating disorders, and the like. Nurses in the workplace also are likely to meet employees with a variety of mental health challenges. Nurses providing services in the health care environment will likely encounter nurseemployees currentl y suffering with mental illness or with a history of ment al illness. Although sad to admit, mental illness is still cloaked with a devastating stigma in 1998. Through media reports and open discussions with celebrity-clients, some progress has been made to erode the "shame" associated with brain illness. However, it would be foolish to believe that it does not exist.
Although slow to respond , Congress has passed some legislation designed to address a few of the concerns shared by those affected by ment al illness. Pre sident Clinton signed the Mental Health Parity Act into law, requiring group health plans to set the same annual and lifetime limits for that coverage as they set on phys ical illness. In addition, the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) offers some enhanced protection for employee s suffering from mental illness. This column reviews the most recent litigation brought by health care workers with a history of ment al disability or drug abuse claiming unfair treatment in a variety of employment settings.
CASE EXAMPLES
A neurosurgeon was required to undergo a second specialized medical evaluation before a hospital would reinstate his privileges following treatment for alcoh olism in Judice v. Hospital Svc. Dist. No. 1, 919 ESupp. 978 (D.C.LA. 1996) . He claimed that the ADA prohibited the hospital from requiring such an exam. However, the court found evidence to indicate that: • The surgeon had a long period of abstinence, after which he had begun drinking again, • Alcohol had been detected in his blood immediately prior to surgery, • He had relapsed during his second treatment program, and • He had denied his addiction when confronted .
Therefore , the hospital was justified in requiring the exam.
In a second similar case, the trial court properly concluded that a physician's disability, his alcoholism, would prevent him from performing the activities involved in the position of Chief of Internal Medicine in a reasonable manner. In Altman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 100 E3d 1054 (C. A. 2, NY 1996) , the court concluded that among definitions of medical misconduct set forth in state law were: • Practicing profession with negligence or incompetence on more than one occasion, • Practicing profession while impaired by alcohol, and • Being a habitual user of alcohol.
The physician, an admitted alcoholic, had engaged in the above described improp er acts, thus rendering him inappropriate for a Chief position .
Still another doctor unsuccessfully claimed ADA discrimination in Alexander v. Margolis. 921 ESupp. 482 (D.C.MI 1995) . On a procedural ground, the court ruled that the physician did not have a valid ADA claim against state medical board members , as the revocation of his license occurred before Act's effective date. Ignoring that fact for a moment , the court also stated that despite his bipolar illness, the physician was not a qualified individual with an ADA protected disability.
Although mental illness is a protected disability, the individual's problem was so severe that the public was exposed to an unnece ssarily high degree of risk.
An employee of a Veteran's Administration Medical Center (VAMC) claimed that she was constructively discharged* from her laundry position because of her disability-s-mental retardation and emotional illness-in Kent by Gillespie v. Derwinski, 790 F.Supp . 1032 (D.C.Wash. 1991 . The employee claimed that the VAMC had failed effectively to accommodate the employee 's disability as required by law. For its defense, the VAMC provided evidence that it had required all laundry employees to attend sensitivity training sessions and had allegedly adopted a "soft approach" to disciplining and supervising the plaintiff. However, she demonstrated that she had been subjected to taunting by her coworkers and inappropriate discipline by her supervisor, including being forced to stand by a wall and being subjected to lectures several hours long. The court ruled that despite the employee's attempts to remedy her situation by talking with a supervisor and trying to please her, and by talking to various counselors, a reasonable person would have found the situation intolerable and discriminatory and would have felt forced to quit. Therefore, it was decided that she was constructively discharged, contrary to acceptable legal principles.
Before the ADA was enacted in 1991, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 served to offer protection for certain handicapped individuals. The plaintiff in Doe v.
*" Constructive dischargii"~tenn iha t applies to situations in which an employee feels for ced to quit a jo b based on unacceptable working conditions. It is treated similarly to "wrongful termination" situations. Region 13 Mental Health -Mental Retardation Comm'n. , 704 F.2d 1402 (C.A. 5, MS 1983 ) claimed that the Act was violated when her employment as a Mental Health Associate with the Child Youth Service program at a mental health center was terminated because of her anxiety, depression, and suicidal tendencies. Although such problems fall within protected categories of illness, the employer presented overwhelming evidence that, despite her previous outstanding job performance, she was not "otherwise qualified" within meaning of the Act. Specifically, in view of her deteriorating condition prior to her termination , the agency was justified in fearing the effects of her continuing suicidal ideations on suggestible adolescent clients.
Generally, for an employer to be found liable for disability discrimination, it must be shown that the employer knew of the employee's illness. Lack of such information proved to be a problem for the plaintiff doctor in Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178 . (C.A. 6, OH 1993 . The internist' s hospital staff privileges had been suspended after he had been caught stealing and disposing of mail from internal mailboxes. The doctor claimed that the president of the hospital had been out to "get" him for leaking confidential information to the media and that, in response to that "provocation," his aberrant mailbox behavior had resulted. However, testimony indicated that it was the board of directors, not the president, who had suspended him. In addition, no evidence existed that the board had any knowledge of his mental illness. The record indicated that the board had been reacting to the physician's misconduct, which it had determined would impair his ability to work at hospital. Even if his behavior had been caused by mental illness, the board had no knowledge of the condition. Accordingly, no evidence existed that the board had acted solely in response to his handicap.
In Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794 (C.A. 2, N.Y. 1992) , a former head nurse at a government hospital was covered as a "handicapped individual" within meaning of the Rehabilitation Act , where her depression and severe anxiety and treatment with sedating antidepressant interfered with her ability to arrive for work shift commencing at 8 a.m. As an accommodation , the head nurse requested that she be allowed to start her shift at 10:00 a.m. The hospital claimed that the request was unreasonable, given the need to have management employees in patient units at established times to consult with night supervisors as to modification of patient treatment. In response, the hospital offered the plaintiff a staff nurse position at hours requested without loss of grade or salary. However, she refused the offer. Therefore, the court ruled that, although "handicapped," she was not otherwise "qualified" to work as a head nurse and, therefore, not entitled to monetary relief.
CONCLUSION
Both the Rehabilitation Act and the newer ADA require that a number of elements be proven to successfully sue for discrimination. First, plaintiffs have to prove their health problems fall within the definition of "disability." Second, plaintiffs have to show that with proper accommodation they remained "qualified" employees. Third, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the employer refused their request for "reasonable" accommodation. It's the "disability," "qualified," and "reasonable" definitions that keep sending litigants to court!
